Analysing the Onus Issue in Dismissals Emanating from the Enforcement of Unilateral Changes to Conditions of Employment by I Tshoose & R Ismail
ISSN 1727-3781 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSING THE ONUS ISSUE IN DISMISSALS EMANATING FROM THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF UNILATERAL CHANGES TO CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
2011 VOLUME 14 No 7 
Author: R Ismail and I Tshoose 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v14i7.6 
 R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
  147 / 261 
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THE ENFORCEMENT OF UNILATERAL CHANGES TO CONDITIONS 
OF EMPLOYMENT 
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I Tshoose** 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The main objective of this article is to analyse the issue of onus emanating from the 
enforcement of unilateral changes to conditions of employment. At the heart of the 
controversy that faced the Labour Appeal Court
1 was how to interpret dismissals that 
appear to be based on operational requirements, and yet at the same time, such 
dismissals also appear to have the effect of compelling an employee  to accept a 
demand in respect of a   matter of mutual interest between the employer and   the 
employee.
2 
 
The core section in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
3 (LRA) relating to disputes 
of this nature is section 187(1)(c) and the central enquiry to such disputes is whether 
they are automatically unfair or operationally justifiable. The fine line that determines 
whether a dismissal is acceptable or not merits an analysis of the overall onus that 
faces an employer and employee. This analysis is the focus of the article, which 
deals predominantly with procedural issues. The issue relating to the promotion of 
collective  bargaining  will  be  assessed  against  the  right  to  dismiss,  based  on  a 
comparative review of South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
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1   Hereafter the LAC. 
2   See Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA 2003 24 ILJ 133 (LAC), and 
CWIU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 2003 11 BLLR 1081 (LAC). 
3   All of the sections referred to herein below are from this statute and therefore direct reference to 
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2  Understanding the onus issue 
 
An  appropriate  starting  point  is  to  address  the  relevant  sections  in  the  LRA  that 
impact on the onus issue and to establish their practical applicability to an enquiry in 
terms of sections 187(1)(c) of the LRA, in the context that faced the LAC in Fry's 
Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA & Others,
4 and CWIU & 
Others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd.
5 In terms of the  LRA with regard to any dismissal, the 
employee must establish the existence of the dismissal.
6 Once the existence of a 
dismissal  is  established,  the  onus  shifts  to  the  employer  to  establish  that  the 
dismissal is fair.
7 
 
Additional provisions relevant to the onus issue are that in terms of: 
 
a.  Section 185 (a), every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed; 
b.  Section 186 (1)(a), the most basic  form of dismissal is when an employer 
terminates a contract of employment with or without notice; 
c.  Section 187 (1)(c), it is automatically unfair to dismiss an employee in order to 
compel the employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between the employer and employee; 
d.  Section 188(1)(a)(ii), a dismissal that is not automatically unfair is unfair if the 
employer fails to prove that the reason for the dismissal is fair, based on the 
employer's operational requirements. 
 
When a dispute arises about   the applicability of the sections   referred to  above 
(section 185-188), the onus issue can potentially be interpreted in one of two ways. If 
the employee relies on section 187(1)(c) as a cause of action,   then in terms of 
section 192(1), the words "any dismissal" could imply that the employee bears the 
onus  of proving  the  automatically  unfair  dismissal  as  it  appears to  fall  within  the 
ambit of "any dismissal". The last two words in section 192(1) are "the dismissal". On 
a technical level, this could also refer to the specific dismissal which forms the basis 
                                                 
4   Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of SA 2003 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) (hereafter 
the Fry’s Metals (LAC) case). 
5   CWIU v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 2003 11 BLLR 1081 (LAC) (hereafter the Algorax case). 
6   Section 192(1) LRA. 
7   Section 192(2) LRA. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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of the employees' cause of action. So, if the dismissal in question relates to section 
187(1)(c), the employee bears the onus of proving that the dismissal was effected for 
the  purpose  specified  therein.  If  the  employee  overcomes  this  onus,  the  enquiry 
comes to an end. Where the employee fails to overcome this onus, the employer 
may still have to prove that the dismissal is fair
8 in terms of a new enquiry, provided 
that the employee can establish a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(a). 
 
On the other hand, a different interpretation could follow relating to the onus. This 
would mean that in terms of section 192(1), all that an employee needs to prove is 
the existence of the dismissal, and not explicitly the type of dismissal specified in 
section 187(1)(c). In other words, to discharge the onus in section 192(1), all the 
employee  needs  to  prove  is  that  the  employer  has  terminated  the  contract  of 
employment with or without notice,
9 after which, the onus will shift to the employer to 
prove that the dismissal  is fair.
10 If this interpretation is correct the employer bears 
the onus of proving that the dismissal was not effected for the purpose specified in 
section 187(1)(c). Where the employer overcomes this onus of establishing that the 
dismissal was not automatically unfair, the employer will then have the further onus, 
in terms of section 188(1)(a)(ii), of proving that the dismissal was effected for a fair 
reason, based  on  the  operational  requirements  of  the  employer.  This  will  entail 
establishing substantive fairness in terms of section 189. It must be borne in mind 
that in terms of section 188(1)(b), procedural fairness must also be established by 
the employer. 
 
3  Critical analysis of sections relevant to the onus of proof 
 
The first issue of contention which needs to be analysed relates to the question, on 
whom does the onus rest when section 187(1) (c) is read with section 192 of the 
LRA. In SACWU v AFROX
11 the LAC held that section 192(2) provides that once "a" 
dismissal is established by the employee, [in terms of section 192(1)], the onus shifts 
to  the  employer  to  prove  the  fairness  of  the  dismissal.  The  court  favoured  the 
interpretation discussed in the preceding paragraph, and reasoned that in the case 
                                                 
8   Section 192(2) read with s 188(1) LRA. 
9   Section 186(1)(a) LRA. 
10   Section 192(2) LRA. 
11   SACWU v AFROX 1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC), hereafter the AFROX case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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of an alleged automatically unfair dismissal, the employer would have to prove that 
the dismissal was not contrary to any reason set out in section 187(1)(a)-(f).
12 
 
The LAC in Afrox referred to "a" dismissal in section 192(1), whereas section 192(1) 
refers to "the" dismissal. Whilst this appears to be technical, these words have the 
potential of impacting materially on the onus issue. As explained hereinabove, the 
word "the" [in section 192(1)] has the potential of imposing the onus on the employee 
to prove that the purpose of the dismissal falls within the ambit of section 187(1)(c). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  word  "a"  [which  is  not  used  in  section  192(1)]  has  a 
generalised  effect  and  allows  the  employee  to  only  prove  that  his  employment 
contract  was  terminated  by  the  employer  with  or  without  notice.
13  In  the  latter 
instance, the employer would then have to prove [in terms of section 192(2)] that the 
purpose of the dismissal did not fall within the scope of section 187(1)(c). 
 
The words "any dismissal" in section 192(1) also infer an interpretation in favour of 
the  employer,  which  would  include  an  automatically  unfair  dismissal.  Such  an 
interpretation would mean that the employee needs to establish the automatically 
unfair dismissal alleged in terms of section 187(1)(c). 
 
Furthermore,  the  word  "fair"  in  section  192(2)  implies  a  fair  reason  and  a  fair 
procedure when it is read with section 188(1). If section 188(1) does not apply to 
automatically  unfair  dismissals,  this  would  effectively  render  section  192(2) 
redundant (whenever automatically unfair dismissals exist), because the fairness of 
a dismissal would need to be assessed only if section 188(1) applies. This raises the 
question of whether or not section 188(1) has any applicability to an enquiry relating 
to an automatically unfair dismissal. 
 
The  opening  words  in  section  188(1),  which  read  "a  dismissal  that  is  not 
automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove….", strongly infer that 
section  188  becomes  applicable  only  after  it  has  been  established  that  no 
                                                 
12   See AFROX case 1725. For further discussion see Janda v First National Bank 2006 27 ILJ 2627 
(LC). For a different interpretation see Mafomane v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2001 22 ILJ 
214  (LC),  which  was  rejected  in  Janda’s  case.  In  any  event  the  decision  in  Janda’s  case  is 
consistent with the judgment in the AFROX case and since the latter case was delivered by the 
LAC it should take precedence over the Mafome case, which is a Labour Court decision. 
13   Section 186(1)(a) LRA. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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automatically unfair dismissal exists. This would then mean that section 192(2) has 
no applicability to an enquiry where an automatically unfair dismissal exists. If this is 
true,  the  only  sub-section  applicable  to  the  "onus"  issue  relating  to  automatically 
unfair  dismissals  would  be  section  192(1),  which  would  mean  that  the  employee 
must establish the existence of the automatically unfair dismissal alleged. 
 
On the contrary it would be more meritorious to hold that had the legislature intended 
that  section  192(2)  should  not  apply  to  cases  relating  to  automatically  unfair 
dismissals,  such  a  material  factor  would  have  been  expressly  catered  for  in  the 
statute. Moreover, it is difficult to accept any inference that the legislature could have 
intended that the employee bear the sole onus of establishing the existence of an 
automatically unfair dismissal. In any event, the stance taken in Afrox removes any 
doubt, wherein the court reasoned that in terms of section 192(2) read with section 
187(1),  for  the  employer  to  overcome  the  fairness  element  in  section  192(2)  the 
employer must prove that the dismissal was not for any reason set out in section 
187(1)(a)-(f).
14 
 
Unfortunately  the  LRA  does  not  directly/expressly   refer  to  the  onus  relating  to 
automatically unfair dismissals. However, irrespective of th e potential  methods of 
interpreting section 192 (when a dispute relating to an automatically unfair dism issal 
arises), what matters for purposes of certainty is the way  the LAC interpreted the 
section in the Afrox case.
15 It should be noted that the court did not contemplate any 
issue of contention regarding the onus issue. In  the Fry's Metals (LAC) case
16 and 
the Algorax case,
17 the onus factor was also not raised as a contentious issue, and 
the LAC in both cases m erely sought to establish the purpose of the dismissal in 
terms of section 187(1)(c). 
 
Based on the reasoning adopted by the LAC in Afrox,
18 it follows that the onus issue 
in the context of section 187(1)(c) may be set out as follows: 
 
                                                 
14   See the AFROX case 1725. 
15   AFROX case. 
16   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
17   Algorax case. 
18   AFROX case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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(i)  The employee needs only to establish the existence of a dismissal, 
in the simplest form, as is defined in section 186(1)(a),  to discharge 
the onus in section 192(1); 
 
(ii)  Thereafter,  the  employer  must  prove  that  the  dismissal  was  not 
effected for the purpose
19 set out in section 187(1)(c), to discharge 
the onus in section 192(2); 
 
(iii)  If the employer overcomes the onus referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) 
hereinabove  (which  would  mea n  that  the  dismissal  is  not 
automatically  unfair),  then  the  employer  may  need  to   further 
establish that the dismissal was effected for a fair reason based on  
the employer's operational requirements, in accordance with a fair 
procedure.
20 
 
This  article  focuses  mainly  on  the  onus  referred  to  in  para graphs  (i)  and  (ii) 
hereinabove. 
 
4  The onus of proof which the employee must establish
21 
 
The onus under this sub-heading relates to the employee establishing the existence 
of a dismissal, (even in its most simplest form), as is defined in section 186(1)(a). In 
other  words,  the  employee  needs  only  to  establish  that  the  employer  terminated 
his/her contract of employment with or without notice. On face value, it would appear 
that it should be easy for an employee to overcome this onus in the context of an 
allegation of an automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(c). However, 
it is worth noting certain important points in this regard. 
 
In the Fry's Metals (LAC) case,
22 the court held that there is a difference between a 
dismissal which is defined in section 186(1)(a) and a dismissal that is contemplated 
                                                 
19   Whilst s 187(1) refers to the reason for the dismissal, the courts in the Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 
and the NUMSA & Others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) case agreed that the 
word "reason" was incorrectly used by the legislature, and the word "purpose" should replace it, 
as the latter word correctly reflects the intention of the legislature. 
20   Section 192(2) read with ss 188(1)(a)(ii) and 188(1)(b) LRA. 
21   In accordance with s 192(1) LRA. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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in terms of section 187(1)(c).
23 The court reasoned that the former dismissal is final 
by  its  nature,  wher eas  the  latter   dismissal  is  not  final.  The  latter  dismissal  is 
conditional and even intended to be reversible if the employee accepts the demand 
of the employer. In this regard, the LAC held that "there may be an argument that a 
dismissal contemplated by s 187(1)(c) – especially if it is understood not to be final – 
does not fit comfortably within the definition of 'dismissal' in s 186(a)."
24 The LAC 
elaborated  that  "the  argument  would  be  to  hold  that  the  dismissal  that  is 
contemplated in s 187(1)(c) is not a final dismissal is to give the word 'dismissal' in s 
187(1)(c) a meaning that is different from the meaning given to that word in s 
186(a)."
25 
 
In  NUMSA  &  Others  v  Fry's  Metals  (Pty)  Ltd,
26  the Supreme Court of Appeal
27 
accepted the reasoning of the court in the Fry's Metals (LAC) case. The LAC held 
that there is a distinction between a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(a) and a 
dismissal  in  terms  of  section  187(1)(c),  wherein  no  overlap  exists.  The  SCA 
confirmed the stance taken by the LAC
28 that the difference in the latter dismissal is 
effected for the  specific  purpose  contemplated  in  section  187(1)(c),  and  that  that 
purpose is absent in the former dismissal.
29 The effect of this reasoning by the LAC 
and SCA is that a dismissal contemplated in section 187(1)(c) does not fall within the 
ambit of a dismissal contemplated in section 186(1)(a), because the latter relates 
only to a final dismissal, whilst the former is not a final dismissal. 
 
The impact of this reasoning by the courts is material in the light of the onus that an 
employee has to discharge (with  reference to section 192(1)), in the context of  a 
section 187(1)(c) enquiry. If an employee relies on section 187(1)(c) as a cause of 
action and the employee cannot establish the most basic form of a dismissal as is 
defined in section 186(1)(a), (because  the employee's cause of action relates to 
                                                                                                                                                        
22   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
23   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 147. 
24   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 147. Incidentally the court referred to s 186(a) in error, as the correct 
reference is s 186(1)(a). 
25   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 147. 
26   NUMSA v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd 2005 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) 708, hereafter the Fry’s Metals (SCA) 
case. 
27   Hereafter the SCA. 
28   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
29   Section 186(1)(a) LRA. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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proving  a  dismissal  that  is  not  final,  whereas  section  186(1)(a)  relates  only  to 
dismissals that are final), this would mean that the employee is unable to discharge 
the  onus  in  terms  of  section  192(1).
30  The only other way for  the employee to 
discharge the onus in terms of section 192(1) would be to prove the automatically 
unfair dismissal that is contemplated in section 187(1)(c). This would mean that , 
indirectly, the employee would bear the  overall onus relating to the enquiry as to 
whether an automatically unfair dismissal exists   (which would be contrary to the 
reasoning adopted in Afrox).
31 
 
If this line of thinking is taken further, i n the event that the result of an enquiry 
evidences that no automatically unfai r  dismissal exists  there will be no need to 
establish if the dismissal is unfair in terms of section 188(1) read with section 192(2), 
as the employee would still be unable to establish that he had been finally dismissed 
in  terms  of  section  186(1)(a).   The  consequence  of  such  an  interpretation  also 
creates the absurd potential of an employee initially presenting his case and arguing 
that the dismissal was not final in terms of section 187(1)(c) without  success, and 
consequently in midstream the employee attempting to argue that the dismissal was 
final, just to establish a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(a), so that an enquiry 
can proceed in terms of section 188(1), to establish if the dismissal was fair. 
 
It is appropriate at this point to consider the in tention of the legislature in relation to 
the content of section 187(1)(c). Did the legislature intend for a dismissal under this 
sub-section  to  constitute  a   conditional  dismissal,  subject  to  withdrawal  if  the 
employer's demand is complied with by the employee? The effect of this question 
and the concerns raised under this sub-heading are negated if it can be accepted 
that a dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(c) could fall within the ambit of a section 
186(1)(a) dismissal. In order to reach such a conclusion, perhaps, an appropriate 
starting point is to address the wording in the Fry's Metals (LAC) case, where Zondo 
JP explained that there may be an argument that a section 187(1)(c) dismissal "does 
not fit comfortably within the definition  of 'dismissal' in s 186(a)."
32 The words "does 
not fit comfortably" create the possibility that a section 187(1)(c) dismissal may very 
                                                 
30   To prove that he/she has been finally dismissed. 
31   AFROX case. 
32   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 147. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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well fit within the ambit of a section 186(1)(a) dismissal, even though not in the most 
comfortable context. Although Zondo JP did not expressly say so, the inference can 
be drawn that whilst the purpose contemplated in section 187(1)(c) is not found in 
section 186(1)(a), that is the only distinction, which in turn does not preclude the 
hard core fact that a section 187(1)(c) dismissal nevertheless terminates the contract 
of employment, in the context of section 186(1)(a). 
 
Perhaps a closer analysis of the definition in section 186(1)(a) may provide more 
assistance in this regard. In terms of section 186(1)(a) a dismissal means that "an 
employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice." In the 
Algorax  case,
33  the  LAC  held  that  the  dismissal s  were  conditional  in  nature . 
However, the effect of the dismissals  was  that the employment contracts were 
terminated with notice, which ought to  ensure that they fall within the ambit o f a 
section  186(1)(a)  dismissal,  irrespective  of  the  fact  that  the  dismissals  could 
potentially be only temporary. Grogan aptly reasons that: 
 
an  employer  that  dismisses  employees  conditionally  subject  to  an  offer  of 
reinstatement  if  the  employee  accepts  a  demand  undoubtedly  terminates  the 
contract. In that sense, a dismissal occurs; the offer of reinstatement is merely an 
offer  to  renew  the  contract  if  the  condition  is  satisfied. Whether  the  contract  is 
deemed  to  be  renewed  or  the  dismissal  is  deemed  to  be  "revoked"  when  the 
condition is satisfied, the nature of the original dismissal does not change. The fact 
is that the contract was terminated, and the employees remain dismissed until the 
condition is satisfied, if it is ever satisfied.
34 
 
The reasoning of Grogan clearly relates to basic legal contractual principles. The 
issue that then arises is that, if an employee relies on section 187(1)(c) as a cause of 
action by advancing the argument that he interpreted the dismissal not to be a final 
termination of the employment contract and a court finds that the employer did not 
intend  to  finally  terminate  the  employment  contract  at  the  time  of  effecting  the 
dismissal, could it be genuinely said that the minds of the parties were at ad idem 
that the employment contract was in fact terminated? Again it could be reasoned that 
there is a meeting of minds that the employment contract is terminated, even if only 
temporarily. 
 
                                                 
33   Algorax case. 
34   Grogan 2003 ELJ 14 at 18. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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It should be noted that in Mazista Tiles(Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers & 
Others
35  the  LAC  endorsed  the  interpretation  adopted  in  the  Frys  Metals  (LAC) 
case
36 and the Algorax case,
37 that section 187(1)(c) relates to a dismissal that is not 
final but conditional in nature. 
 
Despite the points raised under this sub-heading, legal certainty is required as to 
whether or not an employee will succeed to establish a dismissal in terms of section 
186(1)(a) where the existence of an automatically unfair dismissal is alleged in terms 
of section 187(1)(c), [in order to discharge the onus in terms of section 192(1)]. In 
this regard it must be accepted that the dismissal contemplated in section 187(1)(c) 
is a conditional one, as a full bench in two appeal courts (the LAC and the SCA)
38 
have confirmed this. Having accepted the ruling stated in the preceding paragraph, it 
is highly unlikely  that the legislature would intend  a "conditional dismissal" in the 
context of section 187(1)(c) to constitute an automatically unfair dismissal yet, at the 
same time, intend for it not to constitute an ordinary dismissal or termination of a 
contract of employment in terms of section 186(1)(a). 
 
The wording of section 187(1) begins with  "a dismissal is automatically unfair if the 
employer, in dismissing the em ployee...", inferring  by the use of the words  "in 
dismissing"  that the legislature intended the presumption of the existence  of an 
ordinary dismissal when an enquiry is made in terms of section 187. 
 
It is likely  that there will be a meeting of minds between the employe r and the 
employee that a termination of the employment contract is intended, even if only 
temporarily. At the time of the dismissal the employment contract is terminated, and 
the uncertainty of the revival of the employment contract does not provide any legal 
basis to change the status of the existing terminated employment contract, which 
thus falls within the ambit of section 186(1)(a). 
 
                                                 
35   Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers 2004 25 ILJ 2156 (LAC). 
36   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
37   Algorax case. 
38   The Fry’s Metals (LAC) case and the Fry’s Metals (SCA) case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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The  LAC  in  the  Algorax  case,
39  after  establishing  that  an  automatically  unfair 
dismissal in terms of section 187(1)(c) d id exist,  went further to enquire if the 
dismissal would have been unfair in terms of section 188(1), had the dismissal  not 
been automatically unfair.  Having had to assume  that  if  no automatically unfair 
dismissal did exist, the court could only legitimately probe into an enquiry in terms of 
section 188(1) if it was satisfied that a dismissal in terms  of section 186(1)(a) had 
been effected. 
 
The courts approach to conduct ing an enquiry in terms of section 188(1) without 
establishing if a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(a) existed conclusively confirms 
that the LAC considered it so obvious that an ordinary dismissal in terms of section 
186(1)(a) existed that it made no mention of such an enquiry. This is the only logical 
inference to be drawn, otherwise the LAC would have had no legal basis to assess 
whether  or not  the dismissal  was  unfair  in  terms of  section 188(1).  This obvious 
inference drawn from the LAC judgment should serve as a binding  authority on a 
national level. 
 
It is therefore apt to conclude that an employee (in the context of the Fry's Metals 
(LAC) case and the Algorax case) relying on section 187(1)(c) as a cause of action 
should be able to establish an ordinary dismissal in terms of section  186(1)(a) in 
order to discharge the onus imposed on the employee in section 192(1). 
 
5  The onus of proof which the employer must establish
40 
 
As per the reasoning adopted by the LAC in the Afrox case,
41 once the employee 
establishes the existence of a dismissal,  then in terms of section 192(2) the onus 
shifts to the employer to establish that the purpose for the dismissal does not fall 
within the ambit of section 187(1)(c). In both  the Fry's Metals (LAC) case
42 and the 
Algorax  case,
43  the employers presented the argument that the   purpose  of  the 
dismissal  was  to  satisfy  operational  requirements.  In  the former case  the  LAC 
                                                 
39   Algorax case. 
40   In accordance with s 192(2) LRA. 
41   AFROX case. 
42   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case 144. 
43   Algorax case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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agreed with the employer, whilst in the latter case the LAC rejected the argument. 
Since the issue of addressing the purpose of the dismissal relates to substantive 
fairness, it falls outside the scope of this article. However, it should be noted that in 
an  enquiry  in  terms  of  section  187(1)(c)  the  purpose  of  the  dismissal  need  not 
specifically  be  an  operational  requirement  for  the  employer  to  succeed,  as  any 
purpose other than the "purpose" specified in section 187(1)(c) will suffice for the 
employer to overcome this onus. 
 
6  Promoting collective bargaining against the right to dismiss 
 
6.1  South African perspective 
 
Essentially,  in  both  cases  the  employer's  contention  was  that  the  dismissal  was 
effected for operational requirements, whereas the employees contention was that 
the  dismissal  was  effected  to  compel  the  employees  to  accept  the  employer's 
demand relating to the new shift system of employment.
44 
 
Dismissals effected for operational requirements would not fall within the ambit of 
section  187(1)(c)  and  would  therefore  be  acceptable   in  terms  of  this  enquiry , 
whereas dismissals effected to compel the employees to accept the new shift system 
of employment would fall within the ambit of sectio n 187(1)(c), and would therefore 
constitute an automatically unfair dismissal. 
 
In both cases, the LAC had to establish whether the purpose of the dismissal could 
have both effects, namely,  to implement operational requirements and at the same 
time to compel the employees to accept the employer's demand. In both LAC cases 
the court held that both effects cannot be present at the time of the dismissal. In this 
regard, the LAC in both cases held that only one purpose for the dismissal will exist, 
which will either fall within the ambit of section 187(1)(c) or will not. 
 
However, when confronted with disputes of this nature, an appropriate starting point 
is to establish whether a matter of "mutual interest" exists between the employer and 
                                                 
44   For general discussion on these cases see Basson et al Essential Labour Law 103-104; Grogan 
Dismissal 104-108. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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the employee in terms of section 187(1)(c). In both cases the LAC held that a matter 
of "mutual interest" clearly existed. 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of S v Fry's Metals,
45 the Labour Court
46 held that 
"in the event of a dispute concerning a matter of mutual interest, such an issue must 
be resolved by the bargaining process itself which may include a resort to force. "
47 
The LC reasoned that the dispute before the court was an interest dispute as it 
related to the creation of new rights or the diminution  of existing rights.
48 As such it 
should be resolved by the bargaining process. In this regard, according to  the LC, 
the employer should pursue the bargaining process before dismissing for operational 
requirements. 
 
The LC held that the employer's failure to continue with the union's proposal to refer 
the matter for advisory arbitration reflected the employer 's intention  to avoid the 
bargaining process to resolve an interest dispute. According to this court, to condone 
the conduct of the employer, would be inconsistent with the  purposes of the LRA, 
which are  to promote orderly collective bargaining and to promote the effective 
resolution of labour disputes.
49 This view is consistent with section 3(a) read with 
sections 1(d)(i) and 1(d)(iv) of the  Act. In other words, it appears that the stance 
taken by the LC was that matters of mutual interest must be resolved by the 
bargaining process before any consideration is given to the prospect of dismissals to 
be effected for operational requirements. 
 
On appeal the  court in Fry's Metals (LAC) case
50 rejected the stance taken by the 
LC. The LAC held that the employer's bargaining right to recourse to a lock-out in 
terms  of  section  64  of  the  Act  does  not  imply  that  a  lock-out  is  mandatory.  The 
employer may choose to resort to it, and if the employer chooses not to, there is no 
reason evident in the Act that suggests that the employer should be penalised. In 
any event, to hold that the employer was obliged to resort to a lock-out assumes that 
                                                 
45   National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals 2001 22 ILJ 701 (LC) (hereafter the Fry’s 
Metals (LC) case). 
46   Hereafter the LC. 
47   National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals 2001 22 ILJ 701 (LC) 706. 
48   National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals 2001 22 ILJ 701 (LC) 706. 
49   National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals 2001 22 ILJ 701 (LC) 712, 713. 
50   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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the  employer  effected  the  dismissals  to  compel  the  employees  to  accept  the 
demand. 
 
The critical point for the LAC was not the consultative or bargaining process but 
instead  whether  the  purpose  of  the  dismissal  was  related  to  operational 
requirements in terms of section 188(1)(a)(ii). The LAC referred to various sections 
in the Act, confirming that an employer may dismiss for operational requirements. 
The  fact  that  the  LAC  went  to  the  extent  of  pointing  out  the  legitimacy  of  a  fair 
dismissal for operational requirements, even in the case of a protected strike, which 
is  a  forceful  bargaining  tool,  infers  that  the  right  to  dismiss  for  fair  operational 
requirements will take precedence over a legitimate strike, which is a critical power-
play bargaining tool for employees. 
 
Put  simply,  the  LAC  rejected  the  view  that  matters  of  mutual  interest  must  be 
resolved  by  the  bargaining  process  where  dismissals  are  contemplated  and 
thereafter  effected  for  operational  requirements.  The  LAC  certainly  did  not  give 
priority to the bargaining process wherein disputes of this nature arise. It was clearly 
evident that the stance taken by the LAC was that if fair operational requirements 
exist for a dismissal to be effected, the bargaining process to resolve disputes can 
legitimately take a back seat. In direct contrast, Grogan's interpretation of the stance 
taken by the LC is that, where a conflict between the employer's right to dismiss for 
operational  requirements  and  the  employees'  right  not  to  be  dismissed  on  the 
grounds of compulsion to accede to a demand exists, the former right must yield to 
the latter "in cases where the employees have become redundant because of their 
refusal to comply with their employer's proposal."
51 
 
It raises the question  of whether or not the court in Fry's Metals (LAC) case
52 has 
undermined the effect of the bargaining process where an interest dispute arises. 
Cohen
53 submits that once a dispute is classified as a rights or interest dispute, its 
route is predetermined. In the case of the former, the route to be taken is through the 
adjudication or arbitration process, whilst in the latter case, the dispute is intended to 
                                                 
51   Algorax case 6. 
52   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
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be  resolved  through  the  collective  bargaining  process.  Based  on  this  reasoning, 
since  it  appears  that  a  business  restructuring  dispute  is  an  interest  dispute,  the 
predetermined route would be the collective bargaining process. This is in fact the 
interpretation adopted by the LC.
54 
 
As Cohen points out, "the LC held that by 'resorting to a dismissal lock-out, under the 
guise of a retrenchment' the employer was effectively utilising a rights mechanism to 
remedy an interest dispute that ought to be resolved through collective bargaining."
55 
However, the LAC (in   the  Fry's  Metals  (LAC)  case)
56  rejected this reasoning  by 
highlighting  the  importance  of  protecting  the  emp loyer  when  the  employer  has 
operational requirements to effect a   dismissal. This is consistent with the LAC 's 
reasoning in the Afrox case, that "economics dictate that if it is necessary to shed 
jobs so that the enterprise may survive or alter or adapt its business then so be it."
57 
Based on this analysis, it appears that the LAC   has undermined the bargaining 
process wherein interest disputes arise to the extent that it prioritised the right of the 
employer  to  dismiss  for  operational  requirements  over  the  utilis ation  of  the 
bargaining process to resolve interest disputes. This priority, it must be submitted, is 
not inconsistent with sections 67, 188 and 189 of the Act, which evidences the right 
to dismiss for operational requirements under certain circumstances. 
 
So how does the view favo uring the bargaining process (when interest disputes 
arise)  address  the  applicability  of  the  right  of  the  employer  to  dismiss  for  fair 
operational requirements? This view is underpinned by the theory of the migration of 
disputes.  What  this  means  is  that  an   interest  dispute  (emanating  from  the 
contemplation/implementation  of  a  restructuring  exercise)  must  start  in  the 
bargaining arena and must remain  there until the dispute is resolved, except or 
unless the employer can justify a migration  from the bargaining arena to the rights 
arena.
58  In  the  Afrox  case,
59  the LAC reasoned that such a migration would be 
justified  if  the  employer  was  facing  economic  collapse.  In  other  words,  if  the 
employer  started  bargaining  and  his  efforts  failed,  and  (under  exceptional 
                                                 
54   Fry’s Metals (LC) case. 
55   Cohen 2004 ILJ 1885. 
56   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
57   AFROX case. 
58   Cohen 2004 ILJ 1895. 
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circumstances)  if  the  business  was  facing  economic  collapse,  the  employer  may 
then exercise his right to dismiss for operational requirements, thereby legitimately 
entering  the  rights arena.  Put  simply,  interest  disputes  should  be  resolved  in  the 
bargaining  arena  and  only  in  exceptional  circumstances  should  they  legitimately 
migrate to the rights arena. As stated above, in the context of a section 187(1)(c) 
enquiry, the court  in the  Fry's Metals LAC
60 rejected this view. 
 
It is imperative not to lose focus on the onus issue at this stage of the proceedings. 
The employer at this stage of the enquiry needs only to establish that the purpose of 
the dismissal does not fall within the ambit of section 187(1)(c). So how does the 
migration of disputes have relevance to an enquiry in terms of section 187(1)(c)? 
The relevance lies in the words "any matter of mutual interest", in section 187(1)(c). 
Based  on  one  school  of  thought,  if  an  interest  dispute  exists  (under  all 
circumstances), it must be resolved in the bargaining arena, and if a rights dispute 
arises,  it  must  be  resolved  in  the  adjudication  or  arbitration  process.  Hence,  the 
relevance of the theory of the migration of disputes is to interpret the words "any 
matter of mutual interest" in section 187(1)(c) as establishing which arena or process 
must be utilised to resolve the dispute. 
 
The court in the Fry's Metals (LC) case
61 held that the employer should have used 
the bargaining process  to resolve the dispute,  but the LAC held that the employe r 
legitimately  utilised  the  rights  arena  to  effect  the  dismissals  for  operational 
requirements. In other words, the LAC's view infers that the rights arena was the 
appropriate forum to resolve the dispute , whilst the view of the LC is that   this 
migration of disputes is justified only if the threat to the  viability of the business is 
severe  enough  to  warrant  the  migration.   Thompson  supports  the  latter  view.
62 
Counsel for the union used the same argument in  the Fry's Metals (SCA) case.
63 
Similarly  the  SCA  supported  the  view  of  the  L AC  and  rejected  the  migration 
approach. The SCA held that the difficulty with the migration of disputes approach is 
that  both  the  rights  and  interests  disputes  overlap   in  a  business  restructuring 
                                                 
60   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
61   Fry’s Metals (LC) case. 
62   Thompson 1999 ILJ 755. 
63   Fry’s Metals (SCA) case. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
 
  163 / 261 
exercise,  and  it  is  this  overlap  that  does  not  form  the  basis  of  the  collective 
bargaining structure that the statute has adopted. 
 
Even  Todd  and  Damant
64  respectfully  reject the migration of disputes approach   
favoured  by Thompson.
65  Cohen
66  reasons that despite the clear demarcation of 
interest and rights disputes,  such disputes by their very nature also  fall within the 
ambit of section 189, which relates to restructuring for operational requirements. The 
SCA  therefore  dismissed  the  migration  approach  because  of  the  unavoidab le 
complexities that stem from it , which it did not view to be the intention of the 
legislature. 
 
The legal position regarding the migration of disputes  in terms of section 187(1)(c) 
may therefore be summarised as follows: 
 
a.  Both  interest  disputes  and  rights  disputes  overlap  into  the  operational 
requirements  arena,  and  this  overlap  is   complex  enough  to  dismiss  the 
migration of disputes approach in the context of section 187(1)(c). 
 
b.  The  SCA  held  that  this  complexity  is  avoided  if  the  enquiry  starts  by 
addressing the type of dismissal section 187(1)(c) envisages in the light of the 
basic definition of dismissal in section 186(1)(a).
67  It is submitted  that this 
approach  confirming a rejection of the migration of disputes  approach is 
appropriate, as the wording of section 187(1)(c) clearly infers that a  dismissal 
regarding a matter of mutual interest between an employer and  an employee 
is legitimate provided that the purpose for the dismissal does not fall within the 
ambit of this sub-section. This confirms that an interest dispute does not need 
always to be resolved by methods short of dismissal.  
 
c.  In any event, the essence of the migration of disputes approach  is for the 
employer to show that the viability of the business came into question or the 
business  was  facing  economic  collapse   to  justify  a  migrat ion  from  the 
                                                 
64   Todd and Damant 2004 ILJ 896. 
65   Thompson 1999 ILJ 755. 
66   Cohen 2004 ILJ 1883. 
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bargaining arena to the rights arena. The rejection of the migration of dispute 
approach  does  not  mean  that  the  employee  cannot  advance  the 
viability/economic collapse argument, but it is respectfully submitted that this 
argument must be addressed under the enquiry wherein the onus is placed on 
the  employer  to  establish  that  the  dismissal  is  fair,  based  on  operational 
requirements in terms of section 188(1)(a) (ii). This would then eradicate any 
prejudice against the employee emanating from the rejection of the migration 
of disputes approach. The only potential prejudice facing the employee is that 
if he were to be successful relating to such an enquiry, the adjudicator would 
find that the dismissal was unfair
68 and not automatically unfair.
69 However, 
the court in the Fry's Metals (LAC) case
70 categorically dismissed the viability 
(the economic collapse) argument by reasoning that no provision in the LRA 
exists to justify the argument.  
 
d.  The LC's reference to promoting collective bargaining must yield to the right of 
an  employer  to  dismiss  for  operational  requirements,  in  the  context  of  an 
enquiry in terms of section 187(1)(c). This interpretation is favoured in the light 
of the fact that when there is uncertainty if an interest dispute overlaps into a 
rights dispute the LRA does not have peremptory provisions dictating which 
avenue  the  employer  must  pursue.
71  Instead,  there  are  a  number  of 
provisions in the statute that grant an employer the election to decide which 
avenue to pursue. If the employer chooses the dismissal route, that is his right 
(provided he complies with the Act), and if he/she chooses to resort to a lock-
out    (entering the bargaining arena)  that is his/her  right as well (provided 
he/she  complies with the statute). Whatever route the   employer chooses, 
nowhere in the LRA does it state that he /she  should be penalised for not 
selecting the alternative route.
72 Even in the collective bargaining arena, the 
Constitutional  Court  (CC)  in  Ex  parte  Chairperson  of  the  Constitutional 
Assembly:  In  re  Certification  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  South 
                                                 
68   In terms of s 188(1)(a)(ii) LRA. 
69   In terms of s 187(1)(c) LRA. 
70   Fry’s Metals (LAC) case. 
71   Cf SANDU v Minister of Defence; Minister of Defence v SANDU 2007 1 All SA 57 (SCA). 
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Africa
73  highlights  the  rights  or  avenues  an  employer  may  pursue.  These 
rights or avenues are described in the following passage: 
 
Workers exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action. 
In  theory,  employers,  on  the  other  hand,  may  exercise  power  against  workers 
through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or 
replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of 
employment, and the exclusion of workers from the workplace (the last of these 
being generally called a lockout).
74 
 
It therefore follows that provided that the employer uses these weapons within the 
confines  of  the  statute  the  employer  will  be  well  within  his  rights  to  do  so.  An 
appropriate example would be if an employer dismisses employees for operational 
requirements after failing to effect unilateral changes in conditions of employment. 
These dismissals will not be automatically unfair if the purpose for the dismissals 
does not contravene section 187(1)(c). In the circumstances, it is submitted that the 
migration of disputes approach was appropriately rejected by the appeal courts.
75 It 
follows that no onus is placed on the employer compelling him/her to  collectively 
bargain with the employer, in the context of a section 187(1)(c) enquiry. 
 
6.2  Comparing South Africa to foreign jurisdictions 
 
Assessing  the  promotion  of  collective  bargaining  against  the  right  to  dismiss  has 
invited several discussions from academics following the approach taken by the LAC 
and SCA. This robust issue merits further investigation as to the stance taken in 
foreign  jurisdictions,  in  the  context  of  interpreting  dismissals  emanating  from 
unilateral changes to conditions of employment. In this regard a brief look at the 
position in the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada will be considered in comparison 
with the position in South Africa.
76 
 
The position in UK law appears to be similar to that taken by the South African courts 
to the extent that consultation may be desirable when considering  the enforcement 
                                                 
73   Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 17 ILJ 821 (CC). 
74   Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 17 ILJ 821 (CC) 841. 
75   Both the Fry’s Metals LAC and the SCA cases. 
76   See also Petersen Changing Terms to Conditions of Employment LLM Dissertation 2004 chapter 
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of  changes  to  the  conditions  of  employment,  although  such  consultation  or 
negotiation  is  not  a  statutory  obligation  imposed  on  the  employer.  This  was 
highlighted in the case of Hollister v National Farmers,
77 wherein the applicant was 
employed as a secretary and ,  after a decision  taken  by the headquarters to re -
organise its operations, was offered different terms and conditions  of employment 
and different methods of working. Upon his refusal to agree to the new terms he was 
dismissed. He lodged a claim for compensation for unfair dismissal. 
   
After his claim came before several courts the final appeal was heard in the Court of 
Appeal. This court held that the Employment Appeal Tribunal erred in its finding that 
there had not been sufficient consultation or negotiation by the employer with the 
employee prior to dismissal. The Court of Appeal further held that consultation was 
not a statutory obligation even though it may be desirable. The Court reasoned that a 
holistic approach should be taken wherein all  of the circumstances are taken into 
account to determine if the employer acted fairly and reasonably prior to dismissal. 
 
Consultation is merely one of the factors that the court takes into consideration when 
assessing the fairness of a dismissal. In Hollister the court found that the employee's 
refusal to accept the changes to the condition of employment justified the dismissal. 
Similarly, under South African law an employer is not obliged to enter the bargaining 
arena under such circumstances. Procedurally, the employer can legitimately elect to 
follow the dismissal route, provided that he/she/it complies with the provisions of the 
LRA. 
 
In Canada, generally,
78 there is a body of case law tha t supports the view that  an 
employer  is  entitled  to  make  unilateral  and  even  fundamental  changes  to  an 
employment contract provided that sufficient notice of the change is given to the 
affected employees.
79 Procedurally this is also consistent  with the stance taken by 
the South African courts (the LAC and SCA) as alluded to hereinabove, to the extent 
of prioritising the right of the employer to dismiss for operational requirements. 
                                                 
77   Hollister v National Farmers Union 1979 ICR 542. 
78   The word "generally" is repeatedly used because in Canada there are several labour relations 
systems implemented and they are not all always similarly applied. 
79   See Farber v Royal Trust Co 1997 1 SCR 846; Rosscup v Westfair Foods Ltd 1999 AJ No 944 
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However, the stance generally taken in Canada is qualified to the extent that an 
employer  may  not  change  the  terms  and  conditions  of  employment  during  the 
duration of the collective agreement.
80 The employer is allowed to lay off employees 
during this period
81 but only for certain bona fide business reasons. A layoff may be 
permitted  by  the  employer  to  enforce  a  unilateral  change  to  the  conditions  of 
employment. Upon expiration of the collective agreement and after notice to bargain 
is given the statute prohibits any changes to working conditions and issues relating 
to wages until the process of conciliation and a cooling–off period has expired. If an 
employer implements a lay-off to enforce a demand during this period the action will 
constitute a statutory violation. It is necessary to consider if certain aspects of the 
Canadian approach do not offer some benefit to the South African context, in that 
they  would  give  effect  to  the  provisions  of  the  LRA  that  encourage  collective 
bargaining. Based on the decisions of the LAC and SCA in interpreting the LRA in its 
present format, the promotion of collective bargaining must yield to the employer's 
right to dismiss for operational requirements. Whilst this stance is consistent with the 
LRA, it does raise the issue as to what practical effect the provisions in the LRA that 
promotes collective bargaining really have in the industrial arena, when employers 
seek to change conditions of employment. 
 
In terms of section 3(a), the provisions of the  LRA must be interpreted as giving 
effect to its primary objects. Some of these key primary objects are set out in section 
1(d),  namely  to  promote  orderly  collective  bargaining,  collective  bargaining  at 
sectoral level, employee participation in decision-making in the workplace, and the 
effective resolution of labour disputes. To give practical effect to these rights in the 
context  of  this  topic,  perhaps  consideration  should  be  given  to  providing  some 
statutory protection for South African employees similar to the protection generally 
afforded (under Canadian law) for the duration of a collective agreement and the 
intial negotiation period when the parties seek to renew or enter into a new collective 
agreement.  The  scope  of  such  protection  does  not  need  to  be  as  wide  as  the 
                                                 
80   See for example s 50 Canadian Labour Code, s 45 British Columbia Labour Relations Code, 
1996  and  s  59  Quebec  Labour  Code,  RSQ  http://www.canlii.org/en/qc/laws/stat/rsq-c-c-
27/latest/rsq-c-c-27.html  all  of  which  makes  provision  for  a  "Statutory  Freeze"  on  terms  and 
conditions of employment. 
81   Under collective agreements layoffs are temporary suspensions of the employment relationship. 
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Canadian  approach  (as  alluded  to  hereinabove).  If  employers  are  prohibited  by 
statute from altering the terms and conditions of employment during some prescribed 
period (even if it is a limited time period), this would provide employees with stability 
and result in more meaningful engagement between both parties when the employer 
seeks to make changes to employment conditions. A statutory inclusion to this effect 
would  give  more  practical  effect  to  sections  3(a)  and  1(d)  of  the  LRA.  However, 
ultimately the right to dismiss for fair operational requirements should prevail, and 
this right available to the employer should not be undermined. 
 
8  Conclusion 
 
The procedural issue of onus relating to an enquiry in terms of section 187(1)(c) 
raises important concerns which have been addressed in this article. Despite these 
concerns a number of issues have been reasonably clarified. 
 
An enquiry in terms of section 187(1)(c)
82 requires that an employee establish the 
existence of a dismissal in its most basic form as is set out in section 186(1)(a). To 
overcome this onus, proving a conditional dismissal as  is contemplated in section 
187(1)(c) should suffice. Thereafter the employer must estab lish that the dismissal 
was not automatically unfair, in that it was not effected for the purpose specified in 
section 187(1)(c).
83 If the employer overcomes this onus (which would mean that the 
dismissal  is  not  automatically  unfair),
84  then  the  employer may  need  to further 
establish that the dismissal was effected for a fair reason based on the employer 's 
operational requirements, in accordance with a fair procedure.
85 
 
This article has also motivated the endorsement of the ruling by the LAC and SCA in 
Fry's Metals that the "migration of disputes" approach be rejected. However, whilst a 
solution of this nature rejects the notion that an interest dispute should migrate to a 
rights  dispute  only  if  the  employer  is  facing  extreme  circumstances  such  as 
economic  collapse,  an  interest  dispute  must  nevertheless  start  in  the  bargaining 
arena, wherein both employer and employee make a concerted effort to resolve the 
                                                 
82   Read with s 192(1) LRA. 
83   Section 187(1)(c) read with s 192(2) LRA. 
84   In terms of s 187(1)(c) LRA. 
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dispute in terms of section 189 of the LRA 1995. Furthermore, perhaps the time has 
come for the South African legislature to consider protecting employees for some 
prescribed time period from attempts by employers to impose unilateral changes to 
conditions of employment. This is likely to ensure more effective bargaining between 
both parties, and it will give practical effect to some of the existing provisions in the 
LRA which promote collective bargaining in order to resolve labour disputes. In doing 
so,  the  right  to  dismiss  for fair  operational requirements  should ultimately  prevail 
(and not be undermined), as economics primarily dictate if jobs are to be lost. R ISMAIL AND I TSHOOSE                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
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